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Abstract: While the 2010 EPSRC principles for robotics 
state a set of 5 rules of what ÔshouldÕ be done, I argue they 
should differentiate between legal obligations and ethical 
demands. Only if we make this difference can we state 
clearly what the legal obligations already are, and what ad-
ditional ethical demands we want to make. I provide sug-
gestions how to revise the rules in this light and how to 
make them more structured. 
Keywords: robot ethics, robot law, principles of robotics, 
legal obligation, killer robots 
1. The Principles 
Allow me to quote the short statements of the ÔPrinciples for designers, 
builders and users of robotsÕ (EPSRC, 2010) in full: 
1. Robots are multi-use tools. Robots should not be designed sole-
ly or primarily to kill or harm humans, except in the interests of 
national security. 
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots should be 
designed & operated as far as is practicable to comply with ex-
isting laws & fundamental rights & freedoms, including priva-
cy. 
3. Robots are products. They should be designed using processes 
which assure their safety and security. 
4. Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not be designed 
in a deceptive way to exploit vulnerable users; instead their ma-
chine nature should be transparent. 
5. The person with legal responsibility for a robot should be at-
tributed. 
2. Legal vs. Ethical 
The first 4 EPSRC principles are formulated as one factual statement, 
plus a rule what ÒshouldÓ be done; and the 5
th
 principle only has the 
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rule. (The EPSRC principles also feature 7 Ôhigh-level messagesÕ that 
formulate more general Ôthings to rememberÕ. I will not discuss these 
here in any detail.). The formulation as rules is a common and useful 
way of presenting ethical demands Ð though it also has well-known 
problems, esp. in cases where rules conflict. I agree with the general 
direction of the principles, so my suggestion is to revise them, rather 
than to start afresh. In this comment, I will focus on one area for revi-
sion only. In particular, I will not comment on whether the use of pur-
portedly factual statements is conducive to the aims, and whether the 
principles are ethically correct. I will, however, indicate where I see 
problems with the impression that the principles give, of representing 
universally accepted ethical rules. 
My main worry is that the principles fail to distinguish between le-
gal and ethical rules. This is unusual since we normally think that these 
two are logically independent: If some particular action is legal, it may 
still be unethical; if some particular action is ethical, it may still be ille-
gal Ð it is not the case that an action is ethical if and only if it is legal. 
For rules, this means, if we accept an ethical rule, this does not imply 
that there is or should be a legal rule; conversely if we accept a legal 
rule, this does not imply that there is or should be an ethical rule 
(though in an ideal state we would hope for law to be based on ethical 
grounds). The failure to make this distinction has two consequences in 
our case: (1) The principles present legal obligations as ethical de-
mands, which is practically misleading; a reader of the principles may 
consider whether or not to follow the rule, while in their jurisdiction 
they are already legally forced to follow it, and risk punishment if they 
do not. (2) The principles also fail to present ethical demands that are 
not already legal demands Ð this unduly limits the scope of the docu-
ment, which could state demands that go beyond the already existing 
law. In order to improve the principles I suggest two steps.  
Terminological note: I speak of legal obligations and ethical de-
mands; this is just a convention to avoid confusion between the two. 
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3. Legal 
The principles should clearly state what the basic legal obligations are, 
and for whom. For this purpose, legal obligations must be differentiated 
for different agents and, particularly, for different economic systems: 
those who use robotics a) for profit and b) not for profit, e.g. in re-
search & sharing. Furthermore, they should indicate that we do not 
think the current legal obligations in the UK are clearly unethical, so 
we assume that agents in robotics have an obligation to adhere to these 
legal obligations. Otherwise the principles should indicate whether a 
revision of current law is envisaged Ð in my opinion, a good candidate 
would be the ÔThe Investigatory Powers ActÕ (UK Parliament, 2016). 
Finally, we should indicate whether we consider the principles to be 
relevant for the UK only, or to go beyond.  
To put this in terms of comments on the individual principles: Con-
cerning principle 1., there are severe legal restrictions on making and 
selling a product that is a weapon; violating these is a criminal offense. 
The ÔsofteningÕ through the phrase of Òexcept in the interests of nation-
al securityÓ re-introduces robotic weapons for state agents Ð thus prin-
ciple 1 essentially re-states the current legal situation in European 
countries: Weapons of war are limited to state agents, while some small 
firearms (e.g. handguns and hunting rifles) and other weapons (e.g. 
knives) can be licensed for use by private persons (Alpers, Rossetti, & 
Wilson, 2016; Council of the European Communities, 1991). So, at this 
point we should state what the legal situation is and whether we want to 
make special restrictions on the use of robots as weapons. 
Given that the design of weapons Òsolely or primarily to kill or 
harm humansÓ (principle 1) is legal and arguably ethical, we need a 
special argument why the design and use of robotic weapons, should be 
ethically wrong. The discussion about this issue usually concerns au-
tonomous robotic weapons, or Òkiller robotsÓ (ICRAC, 2010; 
Leveringhaus, 2016; Mller, 2016; Sparrow, 2016). If principle 1 con-
siders only weapons of war then it should say so and mention that this 
is already the legal situation. If it wants a more general restriction on 
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robotic weapons, e.g. disallowing use by police, then it goes beyond 
current law and generally accepted ethics. I thus wonder whether prin-
ciple 1 it has a place here, esp. as a first in the list. It is understandable 
that robotics wants to keep its hands clean by staying away from weap-
ons, but that may well not be possible or even ethical. 
Principle 2 explicitly puts laws, fundamental rights and freedoms in 
one bag Ð which is what I recommend we do not do. (I also think we 
donÕt need the awkward ÒfreedomsÓ at all, since these are rights.) It 
states that design and operation must Òcomply with existing lawsÓ, 
which is trivially true, but this is prefixed with the phrase Òas far as is 
practicableÓ. Given that we cannot normally argue that we will comply 
with the law only as far as it is ÒpracticableÓ, this remark needs some 
explanation; or removal. As in the current principle 1, the ÔfactÕ stated 
at the outset ÒHumans, not robots, are responsible agentsÓ has only a 
rather loose relation to the demands made afterwards. And, again, in 
principle 2, we should state what the legal protection obligations are, 
e.g. in UK and EU law, and then indicate what further ethical demands 
we want to make. I tend to think this principle should become principle 
no. 1, as it is more fundamental than the others.  
Principle 3 states that robots are products Ð but some robots are not 
ÔproductsÕ in the legal sense, because they are not sold commercially. 
When they are, the whole barrage of product legislation applies to 
them, in particular the manufacturer is liable for damages with Ôintend-
ed useÕ, has to grant warranty, etc. Again, this should be stated. At this 
point the legal obligations of for-profit and not for-profit manufacture 
and use differ. 
Principle 4 on not making deceptive Ômanufactured artefactsÕ con-
cerns all known robots, since they are made by intentional action for 
certain purposes Ð they do not grow or come about accidentally. Usual-
ly, the ethical obligation not to deceive other humans is not a legal one, 
but in the cases of financial gain, as when selling a product, there is al-
ready a legal obligation of non-deception. The legal situation differen-
tiates between manufacturerÕs, sellerÕs and consumerÕs obligations. 
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What the authors have in mind when they talk about Òmachine natureÓ 
is presumably the obligation not to present a robot as a non-robot, e.g. a 
living being Ð but I am not sure why this particular issue is singled out 
among deceptions (rather than deceptive advertisement, etc.). Avoiding 
that particular deception of users is not a legal obligation at this point in 
time and, given robot hardware, it will be a rare case in the foreseeable 
future. 
The demand in principle 5 that ÒThe person with legal responsibil-
ity for a robot should be attributedÓ is a clear case of re-stating a legal 
obligation Ð though ÔpersonÕ should be Ôlegal personÕ here. A Ôlegal 
personÕ can be either a Ônatural personÕ (like you and me) or a juridical 
person (like a company or a state). Also, what is loosely called Ôrespon-
sibilityÕ here really needs a differentiation between legal liability (crim-
inal and civil) and moral responsibility for actions É and of course 
there is significant literature on both (e.g. Eshleman, 2014). These two 
distinctions may be useful for a re-formulation of the principles. 
As above, legal liability is not something that needs to be demand-
ed: Legal persons are liable for their actions and the law will determine 
how. Having said that, it is doubtful that Òthe personÓ is only one for a 
particular robot at a particular time, given that userÕs, sellerÕs and man-
ufacturerÕs responsibility will exist at the same time. The manufacturer 
will typically be a company, i.e. a juridical person. 
If ÔresponsibilityÕ means ethical responsibility, then the difference 
between ÔuserÕ and ÔsystemÕ actions would need to be used and some 
mention of ÔautonomyÕ may be made. We have argued at some length 
that even autonomous robots do not take ethical responsibility away 
from humans (Simpson & Mller, 2016), so whether we like it or not, 
legal and ethical responsibility remains in place. Even for legal liability 
it seems that the existing sophisticated framework for attribution may 
well be sufficient to cover problematic cases Ð robots are not the first 
products where things can go wrong while it is not easy to identify a 
natural person that is liable. 
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Overall, the principles should state clearly what the current legal 
situation is, in a particular jurisdiction, and whether that situation needs 
to change because the authors see further issues. Also whether they see 
ethical demands that they do not expect or wish to become legal obliga-
tions. 
4. Ethical 
As we have seen, the 5 principles effectively re-state some legal de-
mands that already exist, and this should be made clear. Furthermore, 
the principles should name ethical demands that we want to make that 
go beyond these legal demands. These additional ethical demands 
should be explained with the help of the basic theoretical tools availa-
ble, e.g. mentioning basic universal rules or values (e.g. non-deception, 
respect of privacy), and considerations of utility in consequentialist eth-
ics. This would also help to clarify the relation between legal obliga-
tions and moral responsibility. I suspect that there will be such respon-
sibilities for the designers of robots, e.g. that they are not deceptive and 
will design safe products (principles 3 and 4) and that regulation be put 
in place that allows clearer identification of ethical responsibility. Fi-
nally, the principles should state open ends, and the double open-
endedness of this exercise: There are some things we know about but 
that have not been resolved in these guidelines; also, we do not yet 
know what societal impact robotics may have, and what problems will 
surface in the future. Finally, as Tony Prescott pointed out in the meet-
ing, we do not know whether we will want to allocate ethical responsi-
bility to non-natural agents, one day. 
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